The Bush administration NEVER spoke about Bin Laden or al Qaeda during their campaign for the presidency. When asked if he felt the Clinton Administration had done enough to capture Bin Laden, after the U.S.S. Cole incident in Yemen, Bush replied, "I don't have enough intelligence briefings", in his less than enigmatic mastery of the english language.

During the Bush campaign of 2000, the press pressured Bush as they understood then that Bush had not traveled abroad to any extent and had no experience whatsoever in international affairs. He could not spontaneously identify key players in governments that were known to support terror.

Bush relied heavily on Condoleezza Rice who was his chief foreign policy adviser through his campaign. An expert on European issues, Rice was woefully unaware of middle eastern and central asian affairs. During the campaign Rice said Iran was, "the state hub for technology and money and lots of other goodies to radical fundamentalist groups, some will say as far reaching as the Taliban". She was totally unaware that the radical Sunni Taliban were serious enemies of the Iranian Shiite regime. She was also unaware that Iran was sending significant arms and money to Ahmed Shah Massoud who commanded the northern alliance against the Taliban. When challenged by a reporter, Rice insisted that Iran was "sending stuff to the region that fell into the hands of bad players in Afghanistan and Pakistan." Rice was apparently totally unaware the U.S. supported Pakistan and had thereby facilitated indirect support for the Taliban as the Pakistani regime initially favored the Taliban and provided military and intelligence support. She was also apparently unaware of the money flowing from Arabic countries directly to the Taliban. [Scolio - NYTimes, June 16, 2000].

Colin Powell and Richard Armitage were the only experienced members of the Bush team of foreign advisors as regards Pakistan and Afghanistan and that experience was with the Pakistani military from the 1990 run up to the Gulf War and the late 1980s at the conclusion of the anti-Soviet jihad respectively. All relevant terrorist data and cooperative efforts through Pakistan were beyond even Powell's and Armitage's grasp.

Sandy Berger, National Security Adviser for Clinton, arranged for elaborate transitional national security briefings for the new Bush administration. The number one issue was terrorism and al Qaeda. Each directorate within the NSC composed "issues" memos for Rice and her deputy Stephen Hadley. These memos were enhanced by oral briefings and slide presentations. The warnings did not register with the new administration where the powerful idealists Cheney, Rice, Rumsfeld, and Wolfowitz focused on missile defense, military reform, China, and Iraq. One must question how the administration could impose military reforms without any real understanding of the terrorist threat.

Briefings by Richard Clarke's office described bin Laden specifically as an "existential" threat to the U.S. and as pursuing greater casualties than past serial bombing attacks. The mention of mass casualties with weapons of mass destruction was discussed as an object of al Queda desires and ambitions. Yet, the Bush administraion continued to believe and state that the most important security threat was a hostile regime in possession of missiles able to strike American cities. CIA briefers indicated that Bush's national security cabinet viewed terrorism as the kind of phenomenon it had been during the 1980s - potent but limited and that could not jeopardize the fundamental security of the U.S. "I don't think we really had made the leap in our mind that we are no longer safe behind these two great oceans", Armitage said later. [Annual CIA assessment report 2001 and Joint Inquiry Committe Report, p39].

On January 25, Richard Clarke composed a memorandum to Rice indicating a cabinet level meeting was "urgently needed" to discuss the imminent threat of al Qaeda and that this was not "some narrow little terrorist issue" and that al Qaeda "sleeper cells" inside the U.S. were a major threat. No meeting was arranged. The apparent inattention to the central asian issues abroad also allowed then chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Hugh Shelton, to extricate the navy from it's obligations left over from the Clinton administration to maintain cruise missile submarines within striking distance of Afghanistan. Shelton recalls that Rumsfeld agreed and thought terrorism was "out there but it didn't happen today"..."so maybe it [terrorism] belongs lower on the list".

The first administration meeting of any significance on Afghanistan and bin Laden was a meeting of the deputies committee, chaired by Stephen Hadley on April 30, 2001. The result was a decision to refine existing intelligence and options for a presentation to the full cabinet. Both Armitage and Wolfowitz made statements acknowledging the terrorist threat by al Qaeda and the harboring of terrorists in Afghanistan under the Taliban regime and indicating these issues should be a top priority within the administration. In the meantime, the deputies committee also decided to slow down the review to address political issues related to relations with the Pakistani military. Two weeks after the deputies meeting, Colin Powell's budget priorities presented to the Senate included only one mention of Afghanistan and asked for $7 million - to be used, he said, to promote regional energy cooperation and to attack child prostitution.[State Dept. transcript, testimony of Colin Powell before Senate Appropriations SubCommittee on Foreign Operations, May 15, 2001].

Between May and July 2001, the National Security Agency reported at least 33 different intercepts indicating the possibility of imminent al Qaeda attack. The FBI issued 216 internal threat warnings between January 1 and Septmeber 10, 2001 of which 6 mentioned possible attacks against airports and airlines. The State Department issued 9 seperate warnings during the same period to citizens and embassies abroad, including 5 that highlighted a general threat to Americans all over the world. The Federal Aviation Administration issued 15 notices of possible terrorist threats against American airlines. After viewing a one-hundred minute bin Laden recruitmant video that surfaced simultaneously Bush stated, "I want to bring this guy down" according to advisors. A presidential policy document to approve such a strategy (National Security Presidential Directive) moved slowly through White House channels, however, and when a final integrated plan was completed for full cabinet consideration it took almost two months to find a meeting date that was convienient for all who wished to attend (see September, 4, 2001 below). [Info on NSA from Eleanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, September 18, 2002. FBI threat reports from Michael Rolince testimony-Joint Inquiry Committee Sept. 24, 2002. State warnings from testimony of Richard Armitage-Joint Inquiry Committee Sept. 19, 2002. FAA warnings from NYTimes May 21, 2002].

July 10, 2001 - CIA briefing paper for senior Bush administration officials states, "Based upon a review of all-source reporting over the past five months, we believe bin Laden will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. or Israeli interests in the coming weeks - intends for mass casualties and may occur without warning".[All quotes paraphrased - Elanor Hill, Joint Inquiry Staff Statement, September 18, 2002].

August 6, 2001 - President's daily brief headlined "Bin Laden Determined to Strike in U.S." - presented to Bush at his ranch in Texas. The briefing included the possibility that bin Laden operatives would seek to hijack planes. The hijacking threat was mentioned twice, amid other possibilities. [There are several published accounts of the DPB - the title used is from The New Yorker June 3, 2002].

Cofer Black, CIA, told Pentagon classified annual conference on counterterrorism nine days later, "We are going to be struck soon...Many Americans are going to die and it could be in the U.S." [Testimony of Cofer Black, Joint Inquiry Committee, September 26, 2002].

September 4, 2001 - Bush cabinet met at White House and reviewed a draft copy of the National Security Presidential Directive covering new U.S. policy toward al Qaeda and Afghanistan. The plan was to eliminate bin Laden and al Qaeda and to finally (after over 15 years of neglect due to concerns over Pakistani reaction) to aid Ahmed Shah Massoud and his northern alliance with covert action funds in his war against the Taliban.

September 9, 2001 - Ahmed Shah Massoud is assasinated by al Qaeda operatives with indirect aid from Pakistani sources.

September 11, 2001 -

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- see Ghost Wars a secret history of the CIA, Afghanistan and bin Laden from the Soviet invasion until September 10, 2001, written by Steven Coll, Penguin Press, New York 2004 - Chpts. 30-32.
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